dm-verity: add dm-verity keyring

Add a dedicated ".dm-verity" keyring for root hash signature
verification, similar to the ".fs-verity" keyring used by fs-verity.

By default the keyring is unused retaining the exact same old behavior.
For systems that provision additional keys only intended for dm-verity
images during boot, the dm_verity.keyring_unsealed=1 kernel parameter
leaves the keyring open.

We want to use this in systemd as a way add keys during boot that are
only used for creating dm-verity devices for later mounting and nothing
else. The discoverable disk image (DDI) spec at [1] heavily relies on
dm-verity and we would like to expand this even more. This will allow us
to do that in a fully backward compatible way.

Once provisioning is complete, userspace restricts and activates it for
dm-verity verification. If userspace fully seals the keyring then it
gains the guarantee that no new keys can be added.

Link: https://uapi-group.org/specifications/specs/discoverable_partitions_specification [1]
Co-developed-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Christian Brauner 2026-01-16 15:30:34 +01:00 committed by Mikulas Patocka
parent fb8a6c18fb
commit 033724b1c6
4 changed files with 89 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -1370,6 +1370,13 @@ Kernel parameters
For details see:
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
dm_verity.keyring_unsealed=
[KNL] When set to 1, leave the dm-verity keyring
unsealed after initialization so userspace can
provision keys. Once the keyring is restricted
it becomes active and is searched during signature
verification.
driver_async_probe= [KNL]
List of driver names to be probed asynchronously. *
matches with all driver names. If * is specified, the

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@ -1802,7 +1802,31 @@ static struct target_type verity_target = {
.preresume = verity_preresume,
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
};
module_dm(verity);
static int __init dm_verity_init(void)
{
int r;
r = dm_verity_verify_sig_init();
if (r)
return r;
r = dm_register_target(&verity_target);
if (r) {
dm_verity_verify_sig_exit();
return r;
}
return 0;
}
module_init(dm_verity_init);
static void __exit dm_verity_exit(void)
{
dm_unregister_target(&verity_target);
dm_verity_verify_sig_exit();
}
module_exit(dm_verity_exit);
/*
* Check whether a DM target is a verity target.

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@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "dm-verity.h"
@ -14,6 +15,12 @@
#define DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR(s) DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION " " s
static struct key *dm_verity_keyring;
static bool dm_verity_keyring_unsealed __ro_after_init;
module_param_named(keyring_unsealed, dm_verity_keyring_unsealed, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(keyring_unsealed, "Leave the dm-verity keyring unsealed");
static bool require_signatures;
module_param(require_signatures, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(require_signatures,
@ -143,6 +150,17 @@ int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (ret != -ENOKEY && ret != -EKEYREJECTED)
return ret;
if (dm_verity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree &&
dm_verity_keyring->restrict_link)
ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len,
sig_data, sig_len,
dm_verity_keyring,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
return ret;
}
@ -152,3 +170,30 @@ void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
sig_opts->sig = NULL;
sig_opts->sig_size = 0;
}
int __init dm_verity_verify_sig_init(void)
{
dm_verity_keyring = keyring_alloc(".dm-verity",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
current_cred(),
KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_SETATTR,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(dm_verity_keyring))
panic("dm-verity can't allocate keyring\n");
if (!dm_verity_keyring_unsealed &&
keyring_restrict(make_key_ref(dm_verity_keyring, true), NULL, NULL))
panic("dm-verity can't seal keyring\n");
return 0;
}
void __exit dm_verity_verify_sig_exit(void)
{
key_revoke(dm_verity_keyring);
key_put(dm_verity_keyring);
}

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@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as, struct dm_verity *v,
void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts);
int __init dm_verity_verify_sig_init(void);
void __exit dm_verity_verify_sig_exit(void);
#else
#define DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPTS 0
@ -56,5 +59,14 @@ static inline void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig
{
}
static inline int dm_verity_verify_sig_init(void)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void dm_verity_verify_sig_exit(void)
{
}
#endif /* CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG */
#endif /* DM_VERITY_SIG_VERIFICATION_H */